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Is NIST CSF applicable for developing 
nations? A case study on Government 
Sector in Malaysia 
Research-in-Progress 
Abstract 
Cybersecurity impacts nations in multiple facets as the cyberspace luring efficiency and convenience 
in interconnectivity in our digital lifestyle including the critical national infrastructures (CNI) where 
a break in the weakest link impacts large geographical regions and send ripples across the economy. 
In order to protect the cybersecurity of CNIs, NIST Framework for Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity (NIST CSF), a technology-neutral framework based on industry best 
practices and standards, was developed in 2014. This research-in-progress seek to gain insights on 
its applicability in developing nations, Malaysia, where a qualitative methodology to investigate the 
applicability of NIST CSF in Malaysia was adopted. The Preliminary findings concurred that the 
framework is relevant and it needs to be revised periodically as every CNI sector is critical in its 
own way, and that the cyber threats are ever evolving and emerging. 
Keywords:  Cybersecurity, Critical Infrastructure, NIST Cybersecurity Framework, Malaysia  
Introduction 
Internet dependence is no longer a concept, rather a reality and our cyber dependency will continue to 
rise (WEF 2016). By 2016, 3.5 billion people (47% of global population) are using internet (ITU 2016). 
Reliance on cyberspace will intensify by 2025, with 91% people in developed countries and 69% in 
emerging economies in cyberspace (Burt et al. 2014). With internet, we are inherently insecure, as 
cyber threat cannot be eliminated completely. However, the risks can be greatly reduced to a 
manageable level for society to thrive and benefit from digital technologies (UK.Government 2016). 
Cybercrimes are thriving and developing at alarming rate. The cost of cybercrime in the global 
economy is estimated at USD 575 billion annually, according to BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research 
(Symantec 2016). 
In 2015, some highlights include 430 million new unique pieces of malware discovered, 125% increase 
in zero-day vulnerabilities, 9 mega data breaches reported with total of 429 millions personal records 
stolen or lost and high-profile targeted cyber espionage included the White House, the Pentagon, the 
German Bundestag and the US’s Government’s Office of Personnel Management (Symantec 2016).  
In national security, cyber threats are real and cybersecurity is critical. The cyberspace is a separate, 
alongside the traditional “Air”, “Land” and “The Sea” warfare sphere. On June 28, 2016, the Secretary 
General of NATO, Mr. Jens Stoltenberg, declared cyberspace a warfare domain and confirmed that a 
cyber attack on any of its allies will be considered as an act of war (Paganini 2016). Nations such as 
US, China, Russia and North Korea are suspected to be building cyber armies to increase cyber attacks 
capabilities (Mazlan et al. 2016).  
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The World Economic Forum identified cybersecurity as global risk since 2007. Cybersecurity risks 
include large scale cyber attacks, breakdown of critical information infrastructure and networks, and 
data fraud or theft (WEF 2016). The global risks divided into economic, environmental, geopolitical, 
societal and technological. The nations’ critical infrastructures rely on cyber system, thus, major 
security incidents will affect and impact reliability and safety of the critical infrastructures’ physical 
systems (Ten et al. 2010). The impacts are multiplied because these risks interconnect and create 
waves of cascading effects across all sectors. Cyber risks or breakdown of critical information 
infrastructures have far reaching consequences. Therefore, policy-makers, businesses and civil society 
need to find framework to address cybersecurity risks (WEF 2016).  
The protection of critical national infrastructures(CNI) is priority of nations, due to complex structure 
of interconnectivity and hidden interdependencies (Bagheri and Ghorbani 2008). Cybersecurity 
became highlight in CNI when Stuxnet worm infected the centrifuges of Iranian uranium plant and 
more than 100,00 computers elsewhere (Mazlan et al. 2016; Zetter 2011). Malwares sophistication 
now is able to intercept keyboards and record audio conversations (Flame), execute cyber espionage 
in government network (Red October), and steal government confidential data (Mini Duke) (Raines 
2016). Organised cyber criminals increasingly stepping up to challenge and target CNI, based on 
political, financial and reputation motivations (Bernama 2014; Mazlan et al. 2016; Menn 2015; Zetter 
2011).  
With the rise of sophisticated and plentiful cyber attacks on US’s critical infrastructures (Shackerford 
et al. 2015), President Obama issued Executive Order 13636 which called for development of 
Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (NIST CSF) (Schmidt and Perlroth 
2013). The NIST CSF released in 2014, emphasises on risk management to improve security and 
resilience of CNI, designed as global standard (NIST 2014; Shackerford et al. 2015). The framework 
has flexibility to address cybersecurity risks regardless of organisation, industry or country 
(Shackerford et al. 2015).  
Since 2014, NIST CSF is best practise with 29% of organisations adoption in US (Cieslak 2016). It is 
implemented across CNI sectors, such as chemical, nuclear, emergency services, energy and 
healthcare. It created uniformity in CNI, funnelled sector-specific guidance for NIST CSF (Francis 
2016). NIST CSF developed based on cybersecurity standards, thus it lauded as globally accepted 
framework to be used outside of US and influence global cybersecurity (Shackerford et al. 2015). 
Researches on NIST CSF includes development maturity model, systems for risk communicators, 
and successful pilot to assess infrastructure risks (Almuhammadi and Alsaleh 2017; Casey et al. 2015; 
Fukushima and Sasaki 2016). There are positive reviews and implementation in US, yet it is lacking 
literature on implementation in developing nation.  
Boom and economic progress of developing nations spur rapid development of CNI in developing 
nations. These CNIs rely heavily on cyber connected critical systems (Ellefsen and von Solms 2010). 
In 2015, Ukraine, a developing nation, suffered a complete blackout in 103 cities triggered by cyber 
attack (Timms 2016). CNIs in developing nations risked being cyber attacked and also being used to 
launch cyber attacks against other nations (Ellefsen and von Solms 2010; Timms 2016). The 
expansion of CNIs in developing nations, together with lack of coordinated cybersecurity measures 
opportune as “staging points” for attacks (Ellefsen and von Solms 2010). Developing nations need to 
investigate best practices and framework from mature and experienced nations in cybersecurity 
(Ellefsen and von Solms 2010). A robust cybersecurity framework is able to assist in protection and 
prevention of cyber attacks (Mazlan et al. 2016). NIST CSF, developed specifically for CNIs, is a 
suitable model for the purpose.  
In this research-in-progress, we aim to gain insights into the applicability of the NIST CSF in CNI 
sectors in developing nations with Government Sector in Malaysia as a case study. This is important 
as it provides richer understanding of the NIST CSF and its applicability in developing nations. The 
remainder of this paper is followed by relevant related work on national cybersecurity strategies, 
critical infrastructure and NIST CSF. Then, research design, preliminary findings and conclusion.   
Related Work 
National Cyber Security Strategies  
National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS) is needed for reliability and security of cyberspace especially 
CNI protection (NATO 2013). Every nation need a NCSS based on their political, strategic, legal and 
organisational frameworks, national vulnerabilities and existing capabilities (NATO 2013). Although 
nations address same set of cyber threats, there are major differences in focus and approaches (Luiijf 
and Besseling 2013). The common objectives are maintaining secure, resilient and trusted electronic 
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operating environment, promoting economic and social prosperity, promoting trust, business and 
economic growth, addressing risk of ICT and strengthening resilience of infrastructures (NATO 2013). 
For this research, NCSS released 2013 till 2016 are analysed. There is a spike in the number of nations 
releasing NCSS, especially first NCSS. Based on NATO and ENISA, a total of 48 nations released 
NCSS. For detailed analysis as per Table 1, 38 NCSS from 37 nations are considered. The nations are 
from various regions, such as NATO nations(18), Asia and Oceania(9), Europe(5), Africa(4) and 
Americas and the Caribbean(1). It illustrates cyber security is gaining national attention across the 
globe. 
Table 1: National Cyber Security Strategies (2013-2016) 
There is significant  increase of focus and priority on cybersecurity by nations. The highest number of 
NCSS released was in 2015 at 13. In 2013, there are 9 nations released their NCSS. This is followed by 
8 nations in 2014, 13 nations in 2015 and 7 nations in 2016. There are four Africa nations (Kenya, 
Mauritius, Nigeria and Ghana) released their NCSS in 2014 and 2015. In this period, 26 nations 
released their first NCSS. This is monumental, as the nations are recognising the cyberspace as a 
domain in national security. Each of these nation is prioritising cybersecurity in their national 
strategy. Australia, Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, the 
Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States had previously released their national 
cybersecurity strategies before 2013. From the 37 nations, 9 are developing nations releasing their 
first NCSS except for Turkey which released NCSS prior 2013. This is important development as NCSS 
is crucial to secure the developing nations’ cyber security, given its high adoption rate is usually 
coupled with less mature cybersecurity capabilities. 
Different nations entrust the national cybersecurity under different jurisdictions and purview, as the 
ownership of the strategies are placed differently in each nation. In order to stress the priority and 
importance of cybersecurity, there are a total of 6 Prime Ministers provided the foreword of the 
national cybersecurity strategies. The 6 nations are Australia, France, Portugal, Singapore, Slovakia 
and Spain. There is yet a head of nation from developing nations who is championing cybersecurity.  
CNI cybersecurity is defined and highlighted in NCSS.  All the 38 documents incorporated the CNI 
except for 3. While CNI cybersecurity is mentioned and some explained in these NCSS, it is vague in 
their framework and strategy on how to protect CNI in cyberspace. Thus this calls for a need for 
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No Nation Year No Nation Year
1 AFGHANISTAN * 2014 20 LATVIA 2014
2 AUSTRALIA 2016 21 MALTA 2016
3 AUSTRIA 2013 22 MAURITIUS * 2014
4 BANGLADESH * 2014 23 NEW ZEALAND 2015
5 CROATIA 2015 24 NIGERIA * 2014
6 CZECH REPUBLIC 2015 25 POLAND 2013
7 DENMARK 2015 26 PORTUGAL 2015
8 ESTONIA 2014 27 QATAR 2014
9 FINLAND 2013 28 SINGAPORE 2016
10 FRANCE 2015 29 SLOVAKIA 2015
11 GHANA  * 2015 30 SLOVENIA 2016
12 HUNGARY 2013 31 SPAIN 2013
13 ICELAND 2015 32 TAIWAN 2013
14 INDIA * 2013 33 THE NETHERLANDS 2013
15 IRELAND 2015 34 TURKEY  * 2016
16 ITALY 2013 35 UKRAINE * 2016
17 JAMAICA  * 2015 36 UNITED KINGDOM 2016
18 JAPAN 2015 37 USA  2015
* Developing countries (UN resources)
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specific framework for CNI cybersecurity. United States released NIST CSF in 2014. It is the only 
framework which focus solely on critical infrastructures cybersecurity.  
Internet of Things (IOT) is highlighted as the new threat with 20.8 billion devices by 2020 (Symantec 
2016). IOT security is mentioned in 4 of the NCSS. The nations with the foresight in IOT are Japan, 
Estonia, Czech Republic and Jamaica. Cybersecurity field and territory is ever evolving and 
expanding, as the technology evolve and converge. The need for nations to be alert on the evolution of 
cyber domain is critical, in order for the nations to be prepared for the emerging cyber threats.  
From the list of 37 nations, there is also a trend of setting a specialised centre to focus on 
cybersecurity at the national level. There are a total of 15 nations which set up their National 
Cybersecurity Centres, such as Australia(2014), Czech Republic(2014), Denmark(2012), 
Estonia(2014), Finland(2014), New Zealand(2015),  Poland(2016), Portugal, Singapore(2016), 
Taiwan, the Netherlands(2012), Turkey(2016), Ukraine(2016), United Kingdom(2016) and United 
States(2009). This development illustrates the race to develop and improve nation’s offensive and 
defensive cyber capabilities. It is in line with the development of acknowledgement and formalisation 
of cyberwar. Like other national defence capability, cyber defence capability is in need for national 
security.  
Critical Infrastructure  
In Oct 2016, the allegations of Russian cyber espionage against American political targets and hacking 
in US election campaign, intensified with President Barack Obama’s announcement of sanctions 
against Russia. The US Department of Homeland Security(DHS) and FBI released reports on the 
intervention of  Russians (Thielman 2016). From report by NSA, CIA and FBI, Russia was involved in 
US 2016 presidential campaign through cyberspace (ICA 2017; Meredith 2017). On 6th Jan 2017, 
DHS designated Election Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsector (DHS 2017). During 
conflict, CNIs are targeted to gain strategic advantage. European Union and French Government 
raised concern on cyber attack threats in upcoming key elections throughout 2017, fearing 
intervention of foreign powers as the incident in the 2016 US presidential campaign (Chazan 2017; 
Meredith 2017).  
CNI is backbone of nation’s functionality. In the name of interoperability, ease of use, and efficiency, 
CNIs are leveraging on cyberspace. National and economic security depends on functionality of CNI 
(NIST 2014). Any disruption on CNI has serious impact on national security, economic well-being, 
public safety, and combination of these (Alcaraz and Zeadally 2015). The protection of CNI is crucial 
for nations due its complex interconnectivity and interdependencies (Bagheri and Ghorbani 2008). It 
could trigger cascading effects across CNIs, physically, geographically, cyber and logically (Alcaraz 
and Zeadally 2015; Collins and Baggett 2009; WEF 2016). From networked organisations, it 
progressed to network-structure infrastructures. Based on the concept that CNI is not evenly 
distributed across the country, the hubs need to be secured more urgently, with 80% on 20% of the 
country (Lewis 2006). Due to high-profile effects of attacks on CNI, cyber criminals are attracted. The 
cost of incidents on CNI is reported up to 1.6% of GPD in EU countries (ENISA 2016). A successful 
cyber attack on CNI “would have the severest impact on the country’s national 
security” (UK.Government 2016). 
Government is one sector in CNI in various countries, including but not limited to US, UK and 
Malaysia (MOSTI 2007; PWC 2014). In US, CNI is defined “systems and assets, whether physical or 
virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets 
would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or 
safety, or any combination of those matters.” (Fischer 2005). In order to address the cyber threats on 
CNIs, President Obama called for development of NIST CSF (Shackerford et al. 2015).  
NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity 
Section 7 of EO 13636 orders National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to lead 
development of framework to reduce cyber risks to CNI. It details structure of cybersecurity 
framework, coordination and timeline for development, and maintenance. NIST CSF includes 
industry standards, methodologies, procedures, and processes that align policy, business, and 
technological approaches to address cyber risks. NIST CSF is flexible, repeatable, performance-based 
and cost-effective. 
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NIST CSF incorporates voluntary consensus industry standards and best practices to fullest extent 
and focuses on businesses to guide and incorporate cybersecurity activities and priorities into 
organisations while fulfilling CNI requirements (Alexander and Panguluri 2017; NIST 2014; Teodoro 
et al. 2015). The NIST CSF is living document which continuously updated and improved. The first 
version NIST CSF 1.0 released in 2014, and the draft NIST CSF 1.1 was released in Jan 2017. This 
ensures it meets the needs of CNI in dynamic environment of threats, risks and solutions. Key 
strength of NIST CSF is technology neutral for wide adoption and enable technical innovation based 
on industry standards as listed below (NIST 2014):   
1. Council on Cybersecurity Top 20 Critical Security Control (CCS CSC) 
2. Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology 5 (COBIT 5) 
3. ANSI/ISA 62443-2-1:2009: Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems 
4. ANSI/ISA 62443-3-3:2013: Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems 
5. ISO/IEC 27001:2013 : Information Technology-Security Techniques 
6. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 4: Security and Privacy Controls for Federal IS and Organisations  
NIST CSF provides a platform to close the gap of understanding between executives and IT 
administrators and enables organisations to have a common taxonomy (NIST 2014). It describes 
cybersecurity posture, target state and assessment of progress in cybersecurity. Due to the nature of 
technological neutral and based on industry standards, it potentially expand beyond US, to shift 
cybersecurity landscape and foster global cybersecurity initiative (Shackerford et al. 2015). The NIST 
CSF has three main sections, Framework Core, Framework Implementation Tiers and Framework 
Profile. Each component reinforces the connections between business drivers and cybersecurity 
activities (NIST 2014).  
Research Design  
This research-in-pr0gress is based on case study approach on Government Sector in Malaysia. The 
research is done in Malaysian Administration Modernisation and Management Planning Unit 
(MAMPU), a department under Prime Minister’s Department. MAMPU is the CNII Government 
Sector Lead in Malaysia. The key roles of MAMPU are to lead in developing ICT of the public service 
sector, to consult in management organisation and ICT for the public service sector and to research in 
administrative modernisation and management planning for the public sector. In government sector, 
the cybersecurity impacts national security, and potentially leads to social discontent and unrest, 
especially loss of public confidence (Choo 2011). In Malaysia government, the threats to the assurance 
of confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information impacts public trust, national 
sovereignty, national security and also public service delivery (Dzazali et al. 2009).  
Given the nature of the research, the researcher is adopting a qualitative methodology. One of the key 
reasons for qualitative research to understand a phenomenon where there is not much written about 
the phenomenon. Qualitative approach is defined as a process of understanding a social or human 
problem, based on a complex, holistic picture, formed by words, and reporting in natural context 
(Creswell 2009). For this qualitative research, the researcher listened and captured the essence from 
the qualitative participants and build an understanding based on their ideas (Creswell 2009). The 
researcher become the primary research tool (Creswell 2009). Thus, to prevent bias, the researcher 
need to have firm grasp on the topic and not to have preconceived judgement (Creswell 2009). One 
has to be open to contradictory evidence or negative evidence. In qualitative research, the research is 
focused on the meaning, and understanding the context. 
Preliminary Research Findings  
Internet penetration rate in Malaysia recorded at 77.6% in 2015, a jump of 11.0 points from 66.6% in 
2014 (MCMC 2016). In 2015, 59% of internet users visit government websites. This is a positive 
indicator of effective government effort to provide their information and services online. The 
Government of Malaysia aims to achieve 95% internet penetration rate by 2020 (Mohsen 2015). 
Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission(MCMC) was established in 1998 to propel 
Malaysia as a major global centre hub for communications and multimedia information and Malaysia 
Digital Economy Corporation(MDEC) was established in 1996 to capitalise and benefit from the 
digital economy. MCMC continues their National Broadband Initiatives to increase internet 
penetration and strengthening their effort in overseeing the regulatory framework for 
telecommunications, broadcasting and online activities. In the effort to unleash the ecosystem of 
digital innovation, MDEC is focusing big data analytics, data centre and cloud, e-commerce and 
 Twenty First Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, Langkawi  2017
 
 Is NIST CSF Applicable for Developing Nations?  
 
Internet of Things (IOT). Thus, a trend of growing internet penetration and increase in digital 
economy is expected. This results in higher dependency on the cyberspace.  
The progress of internet adoption and digital economy are coupled with cyber threats. Figure 1 
illustrates the number of cyber incidents reported to Cyber999 Help Centre. The highest number 
reported was in 2014 at 11,918. In 2015 and 2016, the decrease in the number of cyber incidents 
reported to Cyber999 was probably due to emergence of other reporting channels for cyber incidents 
such as Royal Malaysia Police’s Commercial Crime Investigation Department (CCID) and MCMC’s 
Network Security Centre. In 2015, Malaysia Government was threatened of organised cyber attacks 
orchestrated by the Anonymous Malaysia. In Malaysia, the cyber threats are getting more 
sophisticated and organised. Overall, the number of incidents might reduce, however, the scale and 
impact are greater. This is true when the trend of cyber threats targeting the CNI especially the 
Government Sector is growing. 
Figure 1: Cyber incidents reported by Year (sources: https://www.mycert.org.my/en) 
In Malaysia, cybercriminals had hit losses equivalent to RM 1 billion, qualifying the nation to be the 
fifth riskiest country to cyber threats in 2013 (Bernama 2014; Sophos 2013). This echoed by the 
Economic Planning Unit (EPU) report, where the threat of cybercrime was one of the challenges 
highlighted in report of Tenth Malaysia Plan- RMK10(2011-2015). In terms of financial losses due to 
cybercrime, it was reported as RM 148.0 million in 2014 (EPU 2016). The trend of cyber attacks is 
using Advance Persistent Threat (APT) to target CNIs especially military, defence and government 
information. Thus, CNIs in Malaysia should equip themselves to be more proactive, preemptive and 
effective. The CNI Sectors in Malaysia are national defence and security, banking and finance, 
government, information and communication, transportation, water services, energy, health services, 
emergency services and food and agriculture.   
The researcher managed to have preliminary interview sessions with industry experts regarding cyber 
security framework for CNII in Malaysia. Below are the preliminary findings :    
Quote 1: “… a national cyber security framework or strategy need to be updated every 3-5 years...” 
This research finding confirmed the need for a new and updated cyber security strategy for Malaysia. 
The National Cyber Security Policy (NCSP) was released in 2007. The NCSP had passed its final phase 
of implementation, that is Phase - 5 years and beyond. Malaysia cannot be complacent as 
cybersecurity for CNI is core to national security and high dependency of digital citizens of Malaysia 
on cyberspace (Zulhuda 2010). An exemplary example is the United Kingdom. It first released Cyber 
Security Strategy of the United Kingdom in 2009. This is followed by 5-year plan, National Cyber 
Security Strategy 2011-2016. The latest is National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021. This concurred 
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with the NIST CSF as it is a living document, first released in 2014, and in Jan 2017, draft of version 
1.1. is released.  
Quote 2: “… the national cyber security framework will be relevant, if the updated cyber threats are 
considered….” 
This quote suggests two main points, one is a relevant cybersecurity framework and the other is 
updated cyber threats. To be relevant, the national cybersecurity framework need to be connected and 
current. Then it can serve to be useful. There are many factors needed to be fulfilled in order for a 
national cybersecurity framework to be relevant, for example, implementation, budget and talents. In 
cyberspace, the threats are ever evolving and growing. The sophistication and technologies of cyber 
threats need to be updated in national framework in order to protect effectively (Mazlan et al. 2016). 
Based on the annual threats reports and reports of cyber incidents, some cyber threats evolved, some 
emerged, and some are periodic (Symantec 2016). A national cybersecurity framework should 
maintain flexible and reliable to protect CNIs against cyber attacks and to minimise cybersecurity 
recovery time (Mazlan et al. 2016). NIST CSF is applicable here as it is a risk based assessment 
framework, which provide the current cybersecurity posture, allows organisation to set target state 
cybersecurity and to prioritise their controls based on the recommendations, according to industry 
standards.   
Quote 3: “Government is the most critical of all the CNIs and protecting government information is 
utmost important.” 
Since the interviews were done in the Government sector, there is a certain bias in this quote. In 
Malaysia, there are 10 CNIs sectors (MOSTI 2007). Government is one of the more critical sectors, 
and yet it might not be the most critical sector. The naming of Government as a sector is not accurate. 
For example  Ministry of Finance, part of Government, is a sector lead in Finance Sector, Ministry of 
Transport is sector lead for Transport Sector and Ministry of Defense is sector lead of Defense and 
Security. The Government Sector is in the process of  renaming as Government Administration Sector, 
with MAMPU as Sector Lead. The other critical sector is Defence and Security. In the Defence and 
Security sector, it involves the military functions and the police. This especially true as the cyberspace 
is now officially a war space. The criticality of the Government sector lies in the protection of the 
government information. It is the Government sector’s utmost duty. Leakage of government classified 
or proprietary information is catastrophic. With the rise of offensive cyber capabilities of nations, 
Malaysia need to develop capabilities to counter cyber espionage.    
Conclusion  
This research-in-progress captures the need of cybersecurity framework for CNI. Based on the 
literature analysis, there is increasing trend of NCSS development even amongst developing nations. 
This research argues that for quick win in global cybersecurity critical infrastructure protection, 
developing nation could apply a ready framework, NIST CSF, for the nations cybersecurity for CNI. 
NIST CSF is a technology-neutral framework developed for cybersecurity protection in CNI. This case 
study in Government Sector in Malaysia is crucial as an analysis for applicability of NIST CSF in 
developing nations. Preliminary findings concurred that framework has to be revised periodically such 
as 3 years. Every CNI sector is critical in its own way, and needs highest priority, based on the cyber 
threats to the sector. Cyber threats are ever evolving and emerging, a relevant national framework 
need to provide the flexibility to capture the movement in cyber threats. Further research will be 
continued in analysing NIST CSF in this case study. The research-in-progress will also proceed to 
capture the development of NIST CSF, as the revised version is expected to be released in 2017.  
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